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Book Reviews: AMERICAN POLITICS December 2002 
Judicial Review in State Supreme Courts: A Comparative 
Study. By Laura Langer. Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2002. 192p. $62.50 cloth, $20.95 paper. 
Donald R. Songer, University of South Carolina 
Interest in strategic approaches to an understanding of judi- 
cial decision making, including the implications of the separa- 
tion of powers (SOP), has grown dramatically in recent years. 
Unfortunately, almost all the research on these SOP interac- 
tions has been limited to those involving the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Laura Langer's book provides a refreshing alterna- 
tive to the exclusive Supreme Court focus by examining the 
significance of separation of powers concerns for the exercise 
of judicial review by state supreme courts. 
Langer starts by making a convincing case for the impor- 
tance of studying judicial review in state supreme courts. She 
demonstrates that these courts are important policymakers, 
tackling a number of important issue areas for which no re- 
view by the U.S. Supreme Court is possible. 
The basic thesis of this book is that judicial review in state 
supreme courts is shaped by the pursuit of political ambitions, 
the institutional rules and arrangements governing courts in 
the states, the nature of the policy adjudicated by the court, 
and the political context in which the courts operate. Strategic 
models of judicial behavior are developed to explain both 
agenda decisions of the courts and the decision on the merits 
stage. Under a strictly attitudinal model, judges would vote 
their personal ideological preferences without regard to the 
contextual and institutional features of state politics. In con- 
trast, Langer argues that judges will be reluctant to overturn 
state laws in salient policy areas when other state elites hold 
divergent views unless there are institutional features that 
tend to shield the judges from the sanctions of other elites. 
To test these strategic models, Langer examines all consti- 
tutional challenges to state action in four issue areas decided 
by state supreme courts for the period 1970-93. She hypothe- 
sizes that the extent to which judges behave strategically will 
be directly related to the saliency of the issue under consid- 
eration. 
In the most ideologically salient area, campaign and elec- 
tion laws, the results largely fit the predictions of the strategic 
models. Most notably, courts are less likely to docket constitu- 
tional challenges to legislative decisions when the ideological 
distance between the court and other elected elites is large. 
However, the presence of institutional features that might 
protect courts, including a difficult constitutional amendment 
process and a judicial retention process in which judges do 
not need the direct support of either the governor or the 
legislature, increases the chances that a constitutional chal- 
lenge will be docketed. In the decisions on the merits, the 
evidence is mixed. As predicted by the attitudinal model, the 
personal preferences of the judges are strongly related to their 
votes, while the ideological distance between the court and 
other elites does not have the effect predicted by strategic 
models. However, several institutional features that might 
protect judges from retaliation by other elites do increase the 
chance that a challenged law will be overturned. 
For the least salient policy area, welfare laws, agenda- 
setting decisions are much more consistent with an attitu- 
dinal explanation. Most notably, as the ideological distance 
between the court and other elites increases, the probability 
that the court will hear a constitutional challenge increases. 
However, at the merits stage the results are inconclusive. 
Overall, this book makes a significant contribution to our 
understanding of the role of courts in the American political 
system. The focus of most of the previous literature on the 
U.S. Supreme Court has made it impossible to adequately un- 
derstand the role of institutional features and, consequently, 
has made it impossible to adequately test strategic models of 
judicial decision making. In general, the design of this study is 
more sophisticated than the design of most "tests" of either 
the attitudinal or strategic models of U.S. Supreme Court 
decision making, and as a result, its findings may suggest 
new insights for understanding Supreme Court behavior in 
a broader perspective. For example, the findings that state 
supreme courts under certain conditions will engage in strate- 
gic, rather than strictly attitudinal, voting raises questions 
about the widely assumed (e.g., see Segal and Spaeth, The 
Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, 1993) but untested 
theory that the factors necessary for attitudinal voting on 
the U.S. Supreme Court include docket control and its status 
as a court whose decisions are not subject to further judi- 
cial review. In contrast, the widespread finding of extensive 
attitudinal voting on the U.S. Supreme Court would be pre- 
dicted from the findings of Langer's study that a number of 
institutional features possessed by the Court all decrease the 
probability of strategic voting. Among those features are the 
presence of an intermediate appellate court, long judicial 
terms, the difficulty of the executive or legislative branches to 
affect the retention of the judges, and the difficulty of consti- 
tutional amendment. This study further enhances our under- 
standing of the effects of separation of powers by demonstrat- 
ing that the effects that vary substantially across issue areas 
depend on the saliency of the issue. It is unfortunate that the 
importance of issue saliency is absent from most studies of 
separation of powers effects on the U.S. Supreme Court. 
826 
substantive chapter, and the appendices contain much repet- 
itive material, as does the concluding chapter. But readers 
must be wary of skimming passages that are mostly redundant 
because new material that may help clarify the difficult ab- 
stractions is sometimes interjected. The redundancies reduce 
the power of the book's message. 
Third, the book is overlarded with jargon (not just 
principal-agent jargon) and with abstractions. For example, 
the author is enamored with "endogenous" and "exogenous," 
which have a technical (and counterintuitive) meaning in 
terms of the statistical model, and the overuse of which may 
leave the reader confused. Furthermore, the style of presen- 
tation is altogether too abstract. For example, "policy innova- 
tions," or "shocks," or "perturbations" play an important role 
in the analysis. But determining exactly what is meant by the 
terms requires concentrated effort, and virtually all of the ex- 
planations are provided in abstract form-most clearly in the 
course of elaborating upon a complex equation on page 32. 
In the substantive chapter, we learn that the bureaucracies' 
reactions to "shocks" show "sophisticated" and "strategic" 
behavior, which means that they exercise considerable de- 
grees of autonomy from the president and Congress. But the 
lengthy discussion provides no illustration of this "sophis- 
ticated" behavior that would move us out of the realm of 
abstraction. 
Krause has made a significant contribution to our un- 
derstanding of presidential-congressional-bureaucratic rela- 
tionships. His major contribution is that he pounds another 
nail-perhaps the final one-in the coffin of principal-agent 
theorizing and brings us back to traditional political anal- 
ysis, which understands that these relationships are highly 
complex and variable from one bureaucracy to another and 
from one policy area to another. Furthermore, he demon- 
strates that however important one of the political branches 
might be at a given time, American bureaucracies retain suf- 
ficient power resources so as to exercise significant degrees of 
political autonomy-but that political outcomes always are 
contingent. 
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The Dynamics of Rules: Change in Written Organizational 
Codes. By James G. March, Martin Schulz, and Xueguang 
Zhou. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. 228p. 
$55.00 cloth, $24.95 paper. 
Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University 
James March, Martin Schulz, and Xueguang Zhou address 
the fascinating question of how rules evolve in a complex 
organization with a unique data set. Stanford University was 
founded in the decades before the turn of the last century. The 
authors searched and coded a vast Stanford archive of ma- 
terials on rules related to student contact, the student honor 
system, faculty appointment and tenure procedures, faculty 
governance, and finally rules related to accounting, purchas- 
ing, and other administrative functions of a university. They 
are able to examine questions concerning the external and 
internal stimulants to rule creation, change, and suspension. 
No other book equals this one in regard to the breadth of the 
questions asked and the mode of analysis. 
The basic approach of March and his colleagues is to ex- 
amine how rules evolve over time in response to internal or 
external problems. They see rules as recording history and 
accumulating the learning that individuals in an organization 
acquire, including the ways to cope with repetitive problems. 
Because they see rules as a written residue of past efforts 
to regularize responses to internal and external problems, 
they argue that one has to do historical analysis in order to 
understand the problems that generated the creation or mod- 
ification of the rules at an earlier period. Thus, they explore 
a wide diversity of external or internal factors occurring over 
time that are posited to affect rule origin or change. Some 
rules may be very useful in solving a particular problem in 
a specific era but become an unused residue at a later time. 
In other words, all organizations may have rules-in-form that 
are rarely used, due to the fact that the problem-set they 
help to solve has changed over time and no one has had 
their attention called to the fact that a rule is no longer 
necessary. 
Further, the authors address important questions related 
to organizational structure and change. They develop com- 
peting hypotheses that are analyzed with the fantastic data 
set they have developed. One set of competing hypotheses 
relates to the effects of changes in one rule on changes in 
other rules. Given assumptions about bounded rationality, 
a core question has to do with how members of a complex 
organization pay attention to the possibility of changing rules. 
The four hypotheses they develop are 1) The Contagion Hy- 
pothesis: "Changes in one rule generate attention to other 
rules, thus increase changes elsewhere"; 2) The Competition 
Hypothesis: "Changes in one rule distract attention from 
other rules, thus decrease changes elsewhere"; 3) The Mul- 
tiplier Hypothesis: "Changes in one rule necessitate changes 
in others, thus increase changes elsewhere"; and 4) The Sub- 
stitution Hypothesis: "Changes in one rule substitute for 
changes in others, thus decrease changes elsewhere" (p. 70). 
In addition to these four hypotheses, they address a host 
of others that focus on when rules are adopted, how fast they 
are modified, and when they are dropped. They ask whether 
internal sources of problems related to conflict of interest 
or to technical coordination are most responsible for rule 
changes. They also examine environmental factors, including 
the proportion of the university's budget stemming from fed- 
eral government sources. They use sophisticated multivariant 
statistics to examine their long series of event histories. 
Among the surprising findings of this study is that increases 
in federal government funding are associated with negative 
rates of rule revision rather than positive rates, as most organi- 
zation theorists would expect (p. 187). They also find that rule 
change is faster in meeting diverse pressure from the technical 
environment (involving accounting and purchasing) than it is 
in meeting the political pressures that exist on all university 
campuses (p. 190). Their findings also challenge some of the 
conventional views that changes in rules are stimulated pri- 
marily by the effort to manage complexity. They find "very 
few size and program effects in any of our models of rule birth 
and rule change" (p. 170). 
Scholars interested in the study of institutional arrange- 
ments will find this a valuable part of their library. The 
methodology is one that needs to be applied to a diversity 
of organizations. Following an organization from its very 
founding is an excellent way of studying the growth of rules 
as a function, both of the internal coordination problems of 
a growing organization and the external problems that any 
university has faced, especially during the twentieth century. 
The concept of rules as "carriers of knowledge" turns out to 
be a powerful way of approaching the study of rules. 
Institutional theorists with both a rational choice and a 
sociological approach to organizations will find valuable as- 
pects in this book. Chapter 1 presents a healthy skepticism 
about the optimality of rules and the presumption made by 
some that changes in rules usually result in improvements in 
outcomes rather than the reverse. 
Not surprisingly, March and colleagues adopt a strong as- 
sumption that individuals use a logic of appropriateness. They 
assume that individuals "act to fulfill identities, defining what 
is implied by a particular identity or what is expected, socially 
or morally, in a particular situation" (p. 6). The identities of 
individuals, however, are somewhat too strongly presumed 
to stem from rules. After the recent Enron scandal, one has 
a hard time accepting the following: "Rules define organiza- 
tional identities and boundaries and stabilize linkages with 
other organizations. Accountants do what proper accoun- 
tants do. Managers do what proper managers do. Each follows 
rules that define appropriate behavior for the role he or she 
plays" (p. 9). If only that were to have characterized the be- 
havior of the accountants and managers of Enron and other 
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The careful design, extensive data collection, and rigorous 
analysis make Langer's study an important contribution to 
the understanding of strategic decision making by appellate 
courts. Nevertheless, some of the choices on analytical design 
and operationalization of variables tend to reduce the impact 
of what remains a fine study in spite of these limitations. Most 
disappointing, the manner in which the "legal" variables are 
operationalized makes it difficult to draw any significant con- 
clusions on the relative impact of the legal model versus the 
impacts of strategic versus pure attitudinal models. The key 
legal variables are whether or not the court's opinion relies 
on independent state grounds and on the level of scrutiny em- 
ployed (see p. 52). Unfortunately, neither of these variables 
is independent of the decision, and thus it is inappropriate to 
use them to "explain" those decisions. 
Less troublesome, the methods sections need to more 
clearly define some of the variables. In particular, many read- 
ers will not be familiar with the measure of judge ideology 
adopted (see p. 44) and may need further assurances that the 
ideology of judges and the ideology of other state elites are 
really measured according to a common metric that makes 
it reasonable to compute distance scores between the two 
measures. 
Finally, while the direct effects of the independent variables 
in the models are interesting and theoretically important, it 
would have been useful to explore the interactions between 
judge ideology and/or ideological distance and some of the 
institutional variables. 
